


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
The Prospect for Australian- U.S. Defense Cooperation and Operational Arrangements



Thomas-Durell Young

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Cooperation and Operational Arrangements (U)

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The author examines the security relationship that developed between Australia and the United States in the post-cold war era. In addition to discussing background information, he also explores current defense relations between these two countries. The author suggests that while future expectations for continuation of cooperative defense arrangements are not unfavorable, they will not be trouble-free. Failure to coordinate regional policy, irrespective of political profiles, could obviate the achievement of common objectives. The author concludes that in a world of greater international political fluidity, conditions governing alliance relations have changed. To retain mutually beneficial and continued bilateral defense cooperation, a rethinking of the justification and conduct of activities is warranted.

 bilateral defense cooperation;
post-cold war era; bilateral security cooperation;
surveillance and reconnaissance arrangements;
combined exercises; flexible force structures

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-4058 or DSN 242-4058.

THE PROSPECT FOR AUSTRALIAN-U.S. DEFENSE
COOPERATION AND OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The cold war had a rather interesting, if not singular, effect on the security relationship which developed between Australia and the United States in the post-war era. Despite the fact that the alliance between the two countries was founded at the height of the cold war in 1951,¹ defense cooperation between the two states developed isolated from the exigencies of the superpower balance.² Nonetheless, the potential threat to both countries vital interests during the cold war from the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, acted to spur bilateral security cooperation between Canberra and Washington. As such, what few bilateral operational arrangements which were established between their defense forces reflected this "Blue on Red" influence (i.e., antisubmarine warfare operations and control and protection of shipping contingency arrangements).³

Yet, as this strategic "threat" to the Southwest Pacific tended to be ambiguous, the bilateral defense relationship which developed between Canberra and Washington over the years was in fact more influenced by a sharing of mutual interests and objectives, than by being solely reactive to a "clear and present danger." In short, a key rationale for bilateral security relations became one what Morgenthau calls an alliance based upon "ideological solidarity."⁴ Given this solidarity

in basic security perceptions, one could expect that a political basis for continued security cooperation will continue into the post-cold war era.⁵

Notwithstanding this overarching political foundation, important problematic aspects to existing and future defense cooperative arrangements can be expected to develop. While little attention has been directed to this issue to date, it is not without its important implications for the future of the alliance.⁶ Parenthetically, this would not be the first time allied operational arrangements have come under scrutiny and criticism. For instance, the 1951 Radford-Collins naval control of shipping agreement was criticized by Paul Dibb in his 1986 seminal, Review of Australian Defense Capabilities. This agreement, he wrote, suggests "...a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities."⁷ Of course, until the 1980s, the employment of Blue on Red contingencies, while perhaps of problematic relevance to Australian security in a conventional sense, did provide the individual Australian armed services with objectives and missions. This was during a period when Australian governments were unwilling to declare what constituted national tasks for the purpose of national defense planning and force development policies.⁸

The end of the cold war and the decision by the Australian government to structure the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to fulfill nationally-defined tasks, has put to rest the issue of how the ADF will be structured in the future and what types of missions will be expected of it.⁹ There remains, however, the need to discern how these two changes will affect operational relations with the U.S. Armed Forces. As both countries remain committed to the others' vital national security interests, as expressed in the ANZUS Security Treaty, an overriding rationale to provide needed direction to peacetime defense cooperation in the "new world disorder" appears to be lacking. To be sure, to maintain "interoperability" is a laudable objective,¹⁰ but such an objective hardly provides ecumenical direction to defense planners.

Nevertheless, both governments have publicly stated their intention to continue the security alliance and to maintain the ability of their defense forces to conduct operations alongside of each other and to promote stabilizing influences in the Southwest Pacific region.¹¹ If these objectives are accepted as constituting the general policy objective for directing bilateral operational arrangements, then the following issues need to be considered. First, both countries require a diplomatic approach to the Southwest Pacific region which is complementary and relatively similar in objective. Second, the ADF will require a greater capability to deploy and operate

throughout the region and beyond for peacetime tasks (e.g., maritime surveillance) and in conflict due to the altered international security environment. Third, the altered political and security environment could well require both countries to be prepared to conduct operations in the region individually, vice bilaterally. In essence, this work will analyze the problematic aspects which will face efforts to continue existing, and initiate new operational arrangements in the region. This essay will argue that it would be a mistake to consider that previous alliance policies and approaches will be able to provide the necessary political justification for bilateral operational activities in the future.

Current Defense Relations.

Prior to an examination of envisaged problem areas in future Australian-U.S. operational arrangements, it is instructive to describe briefly existing key Australian-U.S. operational arrangements.¹² While not widely known, this bilateral defense relationship, which slowly emerged over time as a result of the signing of the ANZUS Security Treaty in 1951,¹³ produced a very high degree of peacetime cooperation in almost all areas of defense activity.¹⁴ The immediate objective of this cooperation was to provide the Western Alliance with coverage of the greater Southwest Pacific region and to protect Western interests from hostile challenge.

Bilateral defense cooperation in an operational sense was achieved in many areas through the coordination of national responsibilities so as to enable the rationalization of military resources. An example of this approach to coordinating national war plans is observable in the aforementioned Radford-Collins agreement, which provides the basis for allied peacetime ocean surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as wartime defense of sea communications in the Southwest Pacific and Eastern Indian oceans.¹⁵ Following the growth in Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific region in the mid-1970s, these surveillance and reconnaissance arrangements were expanded.¹⁶ To ensure adequate interoperability in this area, in conjunction with other allies, the Combined Exercise Agreement has been used as a master planning document for conducting combined exercises when these maritime forces exercise together.¹⁷

However, probably the most important tie between the two countries occurred with the establishment of Joint Defense facilities on Australian soil.¹⁸ The Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station on Northwest Cape, established by a 1963 agreement; the Joint Defense Space Research Facility, Pine Gap, Northern Territory, established by a 1966 accord; and the Joint Defense Space Communications Facility at Nurrungar, South Australia, established by a 1969 treaty,¹⁹ made Australia a participating member in maintaining the strategic nuclear

balance with the then Soviet Union.²⁰ What is interesting, however, is that it was not until 1974 that the Australian Labor government insisted upon being given a regular series of briefings with high U.S. defense officials concerning global strategic matters which could possibly affect Australia's security by virtue of the existence and operation of Northwest Cape. The accord that eventually emerged from these negotiations, the 1974 Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement,²¹ was later expanded by a number of other arrangements which has resulted in the enhancement of Australian access to senior U.S. defense officials and information.²²

While not technically an operational arrangement, bilateral logistical cooperative arrangements have become progressively more important, particularly for Australia, given its limited defense industrial capability.²³ Notwithstanding efforts on the part of Australian governments since Gough Whitlam's Labor Government to create "self-reliance,"²⁴ or as more recently refined, "greater self-reliance,"²⁵ the ADF's capabilities remain limited in this area.²⁶ Formal bilateral logistic support cooperation dates back to the 1965 Logistic Support Arrangements and is currently governed by the 1989 Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Defense Logistic Support. This aspect of bilateral cooperation has become essential to Australia over the years as the ADF has increasingly procured U.S. matériel and has maintained limited operating stocks.²⁷

Reciprocally, the United States has been able to benefit from this arrangement through access to Australian ports, airfields and logistic support facilities when it has deployed units to, or through, the region. With the closure of the extensive U.S. bases in the Philippines, one can only expect that these cooperative arrangements may become more valuable in the future.²⁸

Regional Policy.

It is not the intention of the present writer to dwell upon foreign policy matters as there has already been sufficient analysis published by more knowledgeable writers on this subject elsewhere. However, the importance of foreign policy direction to defense cooperation is a sine qua non and, therefore must be addressed. From the perspective of the United States, East Asia, let alone Southeast Asia, and even less so the South Pacific, have not been areas where the Bush administration considered it necessary to spend time and political capital.²⁹ As a general observation, when dealing with the region, the Bush administration adopted a bilateral approach to issues. While perhaps not necessarily an inappropriate response to this relatively tranquil area, the fact that the Reagan administration, and particularly Secretary of State George Shultz, took special interest in the region (albeit via bilateral ties), obviously did not sit well with regional leaders used to receiving Washington's attention.³⁰

Of course, the end of the cold war and the dramatic reduction in the Soviet/Russian military presence in the region has relieved the previous need for Washington to deal with regional security issues.³¹ However, at the same time, it is perhaps an embarrassing commentary on the Bush administration that, like too many of its predecessors, it saw the area solely within the context of superpower relations. One could express a degree a hope that this previous policy, which found little support in the region, will be reversed by the new Clinton administration. While it is still too early to discern exactly what Washington's policy will be toward the region, it is instructive to note that Mr. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, has gone on record in support of effecting a closer dialogue with regional countries on defense and security issues. If translated into policy, this has the potential for constituting a significant break with the previous administration's approach to the region.³²

Nonetheless, the obvious emphasis being placed by the new administration on domestic issues and the press to direct attention to more immediate foreign policy matters (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, humanitarian missions, etc.), make the outlook for an activist policy toward the region unlikely.

This is not, however, necessarily a bad thing. It is simply naïve to assume that every region of the world will command constant and close attention by the United States.

However, what is neither naïve, nor bad policy, is to acknowledge such limitations on time and resources and therefore rely upon friends and allies to take the lead in regional affairs. Such a policy, however, does require an external state to be very judicious when conducting policy toward said region. Thus, the early opposition on the part of the Bush administration to Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evan's major regional foreign policy initiative regarding a multilateral approach to Asian security and discussions to implement CSBMs³³ can only deprecate Washington's position in the region.³⁴

That said, it is clear that U.S. security policy will continue to support a bilateral defense relationship with Australia. Indeed, from the perspective of the United States, it would appear that this particular relationship has become a "template" for other security alliances in which the United States participates. As the political and financial viability of maintaining U.S. forces forward deployed in Asia and Europe³⁵ has come under increasing scrutiny following the end of the cold war, a broader definition of forward presence has emerged that is better suited to the new global security realities. The most recent National Security Strategy of the United States (N.B.: authored by the Bush administration) refines the concept of forward presence to include, "...combined exercises, new access and storage agreements,

security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, military-to-military contacts, and periodic and rotational deployments."³⁶

Thus, since there never has been a peacetime need for the United States to station U.S. combat forces in Australia, it would appear that U.S. strategy supports the manner in which Washington conducts defense relations with Canberra.

Nonetheless, the Clinton administration should seriously consider placing existing bilateral alliances within the context of multilateral consultative and confidence- and security-building measures structures, if they are to retain their political viability.³⁷

As a long-standing member of the Western Alliance, and one that throughout its history has not shied from contributing forces to the defense of British Empire/Commonwealth and later Western allied vital interests, Australia's bona fides as an ally in Washington simply are not in doubt.³⁸ And, maintaining close ties with Australia has two practical benefits.

First, the race to cut defense budgets, so prevalent in, for instance, many NATO countries, has not been emulated (to date) in Australia. That the Australian defense vote has not been substantially reduced since the end of the cold war, but has, more or less, remained constant, is an impressive accomplishment.³⁹ From the perspective of Washington the mere fact that the ADF will not be experiencing sizeable reductions

in its order of battle (indeed, in many areas significant capabilities are being procured),⁴⁰ at a time when most other allies are facing significant force reductions, makes maintaining cordial ties with Australia all the more important.

Second, the closing of U.S. naval and aerial facilities in the Philippines has made defense facilities in Australia increasingly more important to supporting U.S. regional deployments. While the U.S. Navy will decrease in overall size and the extent of its presence in the Far East diminishes, U.S. naval and aerial forces will, nevertheless, continue to be active in the region.⁴¹ Moreover, there does not appear to be any move afoot to close or transfer the important Joint Australian-U.S. Defense Space Research and Communications facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, respectively.⁴² One would expect, therefore, that their value to U.S. (and Australian) interests will remain unaffected by the end of the cold war.

Flexible Force Structures.

One of the principal implications of the end of the cold war on Western European force structures has been a requirement for them to conduct a wider range of missions than previously envisaged. This has caused no small difficulty for many European armed forces, since the need for many of them to deploy outside of the Central Region, in addition to assuming new, nontraditional missions (i.e., humanitarian, peacekeeping,

peace-enforcing operations), has become an important force development consideration. Fortunately, the U.S. Armed Forces have long been planned for flexible employment throughout the globe, so this is nothing new; however, other nontraditional missions are. Unquestionably, the end of bloc tensions has expanded the possibilities for the future use of military forces. The problem Western forces now need to confront is how to carry out these new tasks, while retaining sufficient forces and a capability to conduct conventional operations should the need arise.⁴³

One of the long-standing problems which has plagued the ADF has been its large number of national tasks, in relation to its relatively small size. The Department of Defence and Headquarters ADF have apparently been successful in recent years in developing a defense planning and force development methodology which are more responsive to fulfilling nationally-defined operational tasks⁴⁴ in Australia's "declared area of military interest." Therefore, according to official Department of Defense guidance, operations outside of Australia's area of military interest do not in themselves constitute determinants in force development planning.⁴⁵ Subsequent events may indicate that strict adherence to these principles may have been overtaken by events.

One should not underestimate the impact of the policy to shift increasingly more emphasis and resources to the north of

Australia. Since the early to mid-1970s when Australian defense planners began to argue the case for attaining greater national defense self-reliance, explicit in their rationale⁴⁶ was the need to improve substantially the woefully neglected defense infrastructure of the country's barren and sparsely-populated north and northwest.⁴⁷ Since the publication of the important 1972 Defence White Paper, which advocated these reforms, substantial progress has been made in the north and northwest. In terms of air fields, in addition to the long existing RAAF bare-base at Learmonth, on Northwest Cape, a new bare-base at Derby, WA (RAAF Curtin) has been completed, another one near Weipa on the Cape York Peninsula (RAAF Scherger) is being planned, and one at Gove across the Gulf of Carpentaria may eventually be built. While currently largely denuded of operational flying assets, RAAF Darwin retains an impressive expansion capability. Most significantly, a new manned air base, RAAF Tindal, 330 kilometers south of Darwin, is now home to a squadron of F/A-18 fighters.⁴⁸

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has expanded its activities in the north as well. Modern patrol boat facilities now exist at Cairns and Darwin. Most importantly, the acquisition of Fremantle-class patrol boats has enabled the RAN to increase significantly its presence in support of civil missions in northern waters. This capability to conduct civil tasks will apparently be ameliorated through the replacement of

these patrol craft with "off-shore patrol combatants" at some point in the future.⁴⁹

Finally, the Army has created surveillance/reconnaissance reserve units, made up largely of local reservists in the Northern regions: 51st Far North Queensland Regiment, North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE), and the Pilbara Regiment. These units conduct surveillance operations during peacetime and in the event of an incursion into the north, they would provide tactical intelligence of enemy movements.⁵⁰ As part of the Army Presence in the North plan, the Army will complete its transfer of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to the Darwin area in 1993, to be followed by a brigade of 2200 soldiers by 2001.⁵¹

To be sure, these efforts to improve defense infrastructure and maintain a permanent military presence in the north have not been without financial sacrifice. This has been justified, in part, since these military facilities and deployments directly support civil authorities and execute key missions (e.g., sovereignty protection), which have long gone ignored in this vast and underpopulated region. With minor exceptions (e.g., the Returned Services League),⁵² the shift northwards has enjoyed wide bipartisan political support⁵³ (with some minor differences in detail),⁵⁴ particularly in the Northern Territory where defense spending has become a major economic activity.⁵⁵ Intellectually, there has been surprisingly little commentary in the Australian defense

analysis community, which has questioned the manner by which the northern defense orientation has been conducted.⁵⁶

However, two potential problems, not at all related to previous bloc tensions, become apparent as regards the objective of this northern shift and its impact on the capabilities of the ADF.

First, as the ADF becomes increasingly oriented toward operating in the north, a concern may develop in Washington that this "orientation" has become an obsessive preoccupation. Should Canberra continue to direct increasingly more resources to the north, which are not applicable to other areas, the perception may be encouraged that Australian defense has become self-limiting. This could particularly be troublesome for the Army,⁵⁷ given the relatively small size of its maneuver elements (e.g., seven maneuver battalions, within a three brigade structure, out of an overall size of 30,000).⁵⁸

The orientation question is directly related to the second point; the implication of these moves on the capabilities of the ADF. It is not a question of how much of the Australian Army, for instance, is to be stationed at Darwin, or how much it eventually will cost to bring the Jindalee over-the-horizon-radar in to service,⁵⁹ but rather how much of the ADF's attention will be focused on, and tied to, the "Top End." To be sure, the need for Canberra to improve its surveillance and military presence in this region is without question. Yet, it

has been argued that the employment of civil assets for surveillance would be much cheaper to the government.⁶⁰

Fundamentally, just as Canberra watches with a wary eye a diminishing U.S. force presence in the Western Pacific, Washington, for its part, may begin to question the amount of resources being directed to the north, should it appear to be at the expense of, for instance, capabilities which would enable especially the Army to deploy outside of Australia. A conscious effort, as Canberra develops particularly Army infrastructure in the north, to include facilities, or generic capabilities,⁶¹ which will allow for the deployment of Army units in emergencies, could forestall future contretemps with Washington.

One should not infer from the above argument that the United States would ever advise Australia that it should not improve its capabilities to protect its national territory. One of the guiding principles of U.S. alliance policy since the passage of the Vandenburg Resolution in the U.S. Senate in 1947 has been to encourage allies to do their utmost to provide for their own national defense. However, the "new world non-order" is likely to require, at a minimum, a constant, if not an increase, in the number of deployments for peacekeeping and possibly peacemaking operations by Western states, at the very time when many of them are cutting their force structures. As a country which is not sizably cutting its defense structure,

Australia could well find itself being increasingly asked to participate in these missions, which it has long been willing to undertake. The recent deployment of a battalion-size task force from the Operational Deployment Force to assist in the United Nations' humanitarian missions in Somalia, in addition to the large number of Army units participating in other peacekeeping missions throughout the world (which may shortly include Mozambique),⁶² has drawn attention to the peacetime operational limitations in the Army's structure.⁶³ There would appear to be a need, therefore, for Canberra, either to limit its peacekeeping operations to the area of its foreign policy orientation (i.e., Southeast Asia), or expand particularly the Army's ability to conduct peacekeeping missions, while retaining a capability to respond to developments which may threaten Australia's national security interests.

In essence, there is a disconnect in Australian defense policy between stated government objectives and the missions given to the ADF. It would appear that the heretofore strict catholic adherence by force development officials (i.e., resources shall only go to capabilities relevant to the defense of Australia), needs to be rethought. To be sure, this is no small task since government policy is to develop a capacity to defend Australia. And, the relatively limited resources available to force planners, in comparison to the tasks at

hand, make the procurement of capabilities not explicitly relevant to the defense of the continent difficult to justify. However, greater provision needs to be given to procuring capabilities which will make the ADF more deployable and sustainable, neither of which can be considered to be mutually exclusive to the goal of improving the ability to defend Australia and support overseas deployments.

Unilateral Freedom of Action.

During the cold war, the preponderance of known operational arrangements between the ADF and the U.S. Armed Forces was developed in the context of Blue on Red conflicts, either global or regional.⁶⁴ From the perspective of Washington, such arrangements had important benefits. The missions and responsibilities undertaken by the ADF enabled the United States largely to concentrate its efforts elsewhere and such operational arrangements were visible manifestations of alliance solidarity. From the perspective of ADF, these arrangements made Australia a participating member in the Western Alliance and provided close and regular access to the U.S. armed forces. Indeed, even if these conventional operational arrangements were of suspect value to Australia's immediate security concerns, the ensuing special access to U.S. technology, operational procedures, doctrinal developments, etc., had a direct and positive effect upon the ADF's capabilities.⁶⁵

Nowhere, perhaps, is this particular aspect of the bilateral relationship more noticeable than in the case of the cooperative logistic support relationship. As a small, technologically sophisticated defense force, the ADF does not have the financial base, either unilaterally to develop major weapon systems, or to support and supply them. In consequence, technological sophistication brings with it a dependence for follow-on supply and even major modernization programs from the originating supplying country. This dependent situation is, of course, a truism of modern defense technology and Australia shares this condition with most of its Western allies.

The implications of this situation over the years has not worked to the ADF's operational independence, notwithstanding its technological sophistication. It has long been the policy of governments and the Department of Defence to acquire combat capabilities, often state-of-the-art, without complementing these forces with requisite combat support and combat service support formations.⁶⁶ In view of the limited financial resources available for defense when measured in relation to the envisaged missions for the ADF, a discernable degree of dependence on the United States was accepted in force planning and force development of the ADF.⁶⁷ Thus, importance was placed by the Department of Defence, particularly from the latter-1970s onward, on acquiring assurances from the United States on the availability of supply support when required.⁶⁸

With the disappearance of bloc tensions and the world entering into a new phase of more fluid relations between states, it would be well advised to revisit existing logistic support and supply arrangements. During the cold war, where the need to maintain alliance solidarity and to be prepared for a Blue on Red conflict was a major concern, the logistic relationship between Australia and the United States was politically acceptable and militarily appropriate. Without the backdrop of the cold war, the continuation of the current cooperative logistic support relationship may entail new unforeseen accompanying implications. For instance, in a regional conflict during the cold war in which Australia might become involved, irrespective of regional political realities, it would be difficult to disassociate Australia's status as a formal U.S. ally in the context of the East-West balance. Therefore, a U.S. response would not only have implications for Washington's relations with Canberra, but with its NATO and Japanese allies as well.

In the new international environment, this element of alliance management has changed. One can conceive of regional conflict scenarios where it would be politically unwise for Australia and the United States to be seen as operating too closely in concert. Indeed, in line with stated Australian government policy to develop "Comprehensive Engagement" with Southeast Asia and "Constructive Commitment" in the South

Pacific, Canberra's ability to act independently is required, which may include the unilateral employment of military forces.⁶⁹ Conversely, Washington's credibility as an honest broker to defuse a regional crisis in which Australia was a participant would be undermined if overt military support to the ADF were requested by Canberra. While acknowledging that this is highly speculative, altered political realities require a reassessment of the previous dependent logistic support relationship, since it may no longer be mutually advantageous.

Canberra, therefore, should provide resources to its long-stated objective of effecting greater "self-reliance." What this requires, as noted in a recent parliamentary report on the ADF's stockholding and sustainability, is the adoption of an ADF stockholding policy (which it currently does not have) and which would enable independent joint ADF operations at a level higher than exists today.⁷⁰ Exactly how much the ADF is required to do, independent of considerable and immediate U.S. assistance and resupply, is a decision to be made by the Australian government. Less consideration also needs to be given in the force development process to acquiring "sexy" high-profile redundant combat capabilities (e.g., 18 additional F-111 fighter/bombers, as proposed by the Labor government).⁷¹ Rather, there is an obvious requirement to equip the ADF to conduct independent operations (e.g., greater combat support and combat service support.)

This is not to say that the entire relationship should be nullified. On the contrary, such an arrangement, in principle, can continue to benefit both parties. However, new global and regional political realities may dictate less obvious manifestations of alliance defense cooperation, particularly during periods of crisis. One should not lose sight of the fact that alliances are not ends in themselves, but exist for achieving mutual political ends. Given that both countries continue to express their interest in maintaining a bilateral security alliance, supporting defense arrangements need to be reviewed to ensure that they are compatible to the new international political environment.

Concluding Observations.

Future expectations for the continuation of cooperative defense arrangements between Australia and the United States are not unfavorable. Yet, at the same time, neither will they be trouble-free. Activities of both armed forces are already coming under severe scrutiny in order to achieve "economies" by ever cost-conscious political leaders. One can assume that such "soft" budget items such as exercises, training and unit and personnel exchanges, which are essential to maintaining interoperability, will be more difficult to defend in the future. In this respect, the continuation of operational contacts will increase in importance as a means of ensuring a

continuance of needed contact between defense personnel and maneuver units.

Concurrently, the justification for these arrangements cannot continue to be those of the past. For instance, the maintenance of the Joint Facilities to ensure stability of the global balance simply does not have the same credibility today as does their contribution to providing early-warning and surveillance of Australia's own immediate region, as argued by Minister for Defense, Senator Robert Ray.⁷² Regrettably, it is not always easy to change institutional procedures, such as providing new rationales for the continuation of what may appear to be missions for atavistic reasons. If the 1992 experience of a number of members of the Australian Parliament being given only unclassified briefings on the Joint Facilities is any indication, there is much room for improvement on both sides of the Pacific.⁷³

Even if these attitudinal changes were to come to pass, there still remains the need to review important policy and force structure deficiencies. The new Clinton administration needs to decide what its foreign policy ambitions are in the region and how it intends to pursue them. Given the region's importance to Australia, coordination with Canberra to ensure complementarity should be a sine qua non. The failure closely to coordinate regional policy with Canberra, irrespective of the diplomatic profile Washington decides to follow, runs the

risk of isolating a key ally and obviating the achievement of common objectives.

Canberra, for its part, needs to take seriously the current force structure and sustainment limitations of the ADF in relation to their tasks. It almost seems singularly incongruent that a country that has long prided itself on its activist diplomacy and one that is now in the forefront of participating in peacekeeping operations, practically throughout the world, can continue to encourage the development of the ADF for increasingly sui generis applicability in the immediate Australian environment. This is not to imply in the least that Australian efforts to improve its self-defense capability is inappropriate. Rather, there is a growing disconnect in the government's defense policy expectations and its foreign policy ambitions.

One should acknowledge that these problems are not entirely new. And, in themselves, they did not present fundamental impediments to the achievement of common objectives during the cold war. However, in a world with greater international political fluidity, the old conditions governing alliance relations have changed. If Canberra and Washington are in favor of continued bilateral defense cooperation, which is mutually beneficial, then a rethinking of the justification and conduct of these activities is in immediate order.

ENDNOTES

1. See, Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 107-125.

2. I argue this point in my work, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951-1986, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, passim.

3. This is seen, for instance, in the intensification in defense ties between the ANZUS countries from 1976 to 1984. See, ibid., pp. 4-5; 68-71.

4. See, Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 183-184.

5. I argue this point in my essay, "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," Armed Forces and Society, Volume 17, No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 277-297.

6. An exception to this generalization is found in, Graeme Cheeseman and Michael McKinley, "Moments Lost: Promise, Disappointment and Contradictions in the Australian-United States Defence Relationship," Australian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, No. 2, November 1992, pp. 203-220.

7. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service (AGPS), March 1986, p. 47.

8. Ibid., pp. 27-30.

9. See, idem, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 88, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1992.

10. As articulated in, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region), A Strategic Framework for the Asian Rim: Report to Congress 1992, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, pp. 21-22.

11. "Close defence relations with the US remain central to our policy of defence self-reliance. They also reinforce Australia's standing in the region and provide us with security against

nuclear intimidation. The joint defence facilities contribute to maintaining the global strategic balance and support equitable and verifiable arms reduction measures." See, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, endorsed by Government, 27 November 1989, Canberra, September 1992, p. 45 (point 6.15); and, "The steadfast friendship of our close ally Australia continues to provide a source of strength for regional security tasks, economic development and political stability....Its willingness to host critical communications and intelligence facilities and to facilitate frequent ship visits and exercises makes it an invaluable strategic partner." See, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, p. 6.

12. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, *passim*.

13. One should recognize that the ANZUS Security Treaty was crucial to the development of security ties between Canberra and Washington because Australia was distinguished as a formal ally of the United States. This was fundamentally important and can be seen in terms of Australia's ability to participate in many defense activities with the U.S. Armed Forces as stipulated in U.S. legislation, e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. Australia was made eligible for such important areas of cooperation as logistics, intelligence, sales of frontline platforms and sensors, and their subsequent priority in delivery. What is interesting is that the only other countries with this important legal distinction are the NATO allies and Japan.

14. See, Young, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, *passim*.

15. See my essay, "ANZUS Naval Relations, 1951-85," in Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy, ed. by T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick and P.D. Jones, Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1991, pp. 296-315.

16. Apparently, a major concern for Australia and New Zealand at the 1976 ANZUS Council meeting. For Australian attitudes going into the conference see, The Age (Melbourne), July 31, 1976. See as well, "Comment and Discussion: A Policy of Denial, or Armed Neutrality?", Pacific Defence Reporter, Volume 13, No. 3, September 1986, p. 3.

17. See, Young, Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Relations, p. 132.

18. The published literature on the Joint Facilities in Australia is rather extensive. For example see, Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980; idem., Pine Gap: Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988; idem., A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987; and, idem., Australia's Secret Space Programs, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988. It difficult to know whether the account of the missions and activities of these facilities as argued by Professor Ball is correct, given the official secrecy surrounding many of their activities. Therefore, these works are cited here without acknowledging the veracity of the information presented. However, what one can comment upon, and disagree with, is Professor Ball's interpretation of the political implications of the facilities for Australian security. Cf., Thomas-Durell Young, "The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship: Merely a Suitable Piece of Real Estate?", Comparative Strategy, Volume 8, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125-138.

19. For copies of these and subsequent amending treaties see, Alan Burnett with Thomas-Durell Young and Christine Wilson, The ANZUS Documents, Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1991.

20. By actively assisting in the operation of the least vulnerable arm of the U.S. strategic triad (i.e., hosting a very-low frequency naval communications station at Northwest Cape), Australia's "relative state of splendid detachment physically, strategically, and politically from the world of strategic nuclear war" came to an abrupt end. See, Roy Neil Wallace, "The Australian Purchase of Three United States Guided Missile Destroyers: A Study of the Defense Aspect of Australian-United States Relations," (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1980), p. 204.

21. See, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1974, pp. 54-55.

22. For more details on this subject see "The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship."

23. This has not always been without its difficulties to the ADF. However, its advantages, in the opinion of its users, far outweigh its peculiar problems. See, Neil Chenoweth, "Guarding the Change," The Bulletin, March 31, 1992, p. 24.

24. See, Australian Defence: Major Decisions Since December 1972, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975, p. 1.

25. For greater analysis of this issue see my essay, "Australia's Defence Planning after the Cold War," The Pacific Review, Volume 4, No. 3, 1991, pp. 222-232; and, Alan Stephens, "The Limits of Self-Reliance," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April-May, 1992, pp. 12-14.

26. The RAAF acknowledged to a parliamentary defense subcommittee that it holds only a 30-day munitions supply. However, it is instructive to note that Air Commodore Don Tidd, "who fought in Vietnam, said the US had always treated the RAAF 'almost like one of their own squadrons.'" See, The Australian (Canberra), July 8, 1992.

27. See, Burnett et al., The ANZUS Documents, pp. 139-169; 202-208.

28. For example, the Australian government has offered Washington the option to relocate bombing and air-training ranges in the Philippines to a RAAF range currently being developed at the Delamere Range, near RAAF Base Tindal in Northern Territory. This would apparently augment access the United States already has to air training facilities in Australia, which include Lancelin Range in Western Australia. See, The Age (Melbourne), March 7, 1992. The Opposition has offered greater access to the U.S. Air Force and Navy in its recent defense policy paper. See, The Age (Melbourne), October 19, 1992.

29. See, Robert Oxnam, "Asia/Pacific Challenges," Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, No. 1, 1993, pp. 62-64.

30. During a recent visit to Canberra for discussions with government officials, the current author found this criticism of the Bush administration to be extremely widespread, President Bush's trip to Australia notwithstanding.

31. See, Desmond Ball, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1991, pp. 8-9.

32. See, The Age (Melbourne), April 2, 1993; and, The Sydney Morning Herald, April 3, 1993.

33. For background on this subject see, Peter Polomka, "Towards a 'Pacific House,'" Survival, Volume 33, No. 2, April-March 1991, pp. 173-182.

34. For Minister Evan's proposal see, The International Herald Tribune (Paris), July 27, 1990. For the Bush administration's policy on Asia see, James A. Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs, Volume 70, No. 5, Winter 1991/92, particularly pp. 5-6.

35. For background on this contemporary issue see, Don M. Snider, "US Military Forces in Europe: how low can we go?", Survival, Volume 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 24-39; and, William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Defining U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

36. The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993, p. 14.

37. See, Thomas L. Wilborn, Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 24, 1993.

38. See, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, p. 6.

39. See comments attributed to Minister for Defence Science and Personnel Gordon Bilney in Cameron Forbes' lengthy essay in The Age (Melbourne), January 4 and 6, 1992.

40. For example, frigates, submarines, and helicopters. For a comprehensive review of the capital acquisition program of the ADF see, Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Report 1991-1992, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991, pp. 100-107.

41. See, National Security Strategy, pp. 7-8; 19.

42. See, Herschel Hurst, "Why We Need North-West Cape," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, February-March 1992, p. 14.

43. For background on this issue, admittedly from a North Atlantic perspective see, Interim Report of the Sub-committee on the Future of the Armed Forces, Reorganizing and Restructuring Military Forces in Europe, DSC/AF (91) 6, Bruxelles, North Atlantic Assembly, Defence and Security Committee, October 1991, pp. 2-14.

44. See, Dibb, The Conceptual Basis for Australia's Defence Planning; and, Frank Lewincamp, "Strategic Guidance and Force Structure: The Force Development Process," FDA Presentation to Acquisition and Logistics Project Management Course, Canberra, Department of Defence, July 21, 1992.

45. "The area of direct military interest includes Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-West Pacific." Australia, Department of Defence, Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: AGPS, 1987, p. 2 (fn 1). For greater explanation of what constitutes the ADF's operational concepts see, Australia, Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Canberra, Departmental Publications, November 27, 1989, pp. 41-46.

46. For one of the most eloquent arguments on this point see, former Minister for Defence Kim Beazley's Hermann Black Forum Lecture, Sydney, September 13, 1989, Washington, DC, Embassy of Australia, Australian Overseas Information Service, pp. 5-6 ("Continental Defense Only Option").

47. The policy basis for this change in defense orientation can be found in, Australia, Department of Defence, Australian Defence Review, Canberra: AGPS, 1972; and, Australia, Department of Defence, Australian Defence, November 1976, Canberra: AGPS, 1976. For commentary on this important change in defense policy and thinking see, Robert O'Neill, ed., The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1976; and, Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980.

48. Briefings, RAAF Darwin and RAAF Tindal, December 1992. See, Australia, Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, 1991, Canberra: AGPS, May 1991, pp. 17-18; 30.

49. See, Norman Friedman, "World Navies in Review," USNI Proceedings, Volume 119/3/1081, March 1993, p. 110.

50. Briefings, NORFORCE Headquarters and Land Component Headquarters, Northern Command, Darwin, December 1992.

51. Briefing, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Waler Barracks, Palmerston, NT, December 1992. See, Force Structure Review, pp. 23-24; and, The Mercury (Hobart), October 2, 1992.

52. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 26, 1992.

53. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 27, 1992.
54. See, A Strong Australia: Rebuilding Australia's Defence, Defence Policy of the Federal Liberal Party/National Party Coalition, Canberra, October 1992, pp. 61-65.
55. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 19, 1992 and March 4, 1993.
56. One notable exception to this is, Alan Stephens, ed., Defending the Air/Sea Gap: Exploiting Advanced Technology and Disproportionate Response to Defend Australia, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1992.
57. According to David Horner and Stewart Woodman, the Army "does not know what it is supposed to do, is unable to mount sustained operations, and is teetering on the brink of failure." See, The Sydney Morning Herald, July 5, 1991. For additional details see, David Horner, ed., Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 77, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1991.
58. The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, p. 141.
59. For a status report on Jindalee see, "RAAF's First Over-the-Horizon Radar Begins Operations," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 1992, p. 16.
60. See, W.J. Meeke, "Coastal Surveillance: The Operator's Perspective," in Desmond J. Ball, ed., Air Power: Global Developments and Australian Perspectives, Sydney: Pergamon-Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988, p. 439. Cf., comments by Air Marshal David Evans, RAAF (retd) concerning the current ineffective civil force, Coastwatch, in, The Sydney Morning Herald, January 21, 1992.
61. The Army for many years has been incapable of procuring sealift to enable it to deploy and sustain itself beyond (and indeed around) Australia. And, this apparently does not appear to be a problem which warrants great attention in Canberra. The decision to procure a helicopter support ship has been delayed until the end of this decade. See, Force Structure Review, p. 28.
62. See, The Canberra Times, April 14, 1993.

63. See, The Australian (Sydney), January 18, 1993; The Canberra Times, January 19, 1993; and, The Australian (Sydney), January 22, 1993.

64. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand and United States Security Relations, pp. 57-83.

65. Ibid., particularly, pp. 188-200.

66. For the best (and indeed damning) assessment of the failure of successive governments, Defense Central and HQADF to come to terms with long-standing logistical shortcomings see, Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Stockholding and Sustainability in the Australian Defence Force, Canberra, AGPS, 1992.

67. Note that Minister for Defence Kim Beazley admitted as much that the U.S. logistic support relationship was essential to maintaining Australia's national security and in order to contribute to the security objectives Western Alliance. See, Kim C. Beazley, "Australia and the Asia Pacific Region: A Strategy of Self-Reliance and Alliance," address to the Washington Center of the Asia Society, June 1988.

68. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, pp. 89-90, particularly fn. 31 (p. 99).

69. See, Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs, December 1989, pp. 44-45.

70. See, Stockholding and Sustainability in the Australian Defence Force, pp. 1-20; 65-66.

71. See, The Age (Melbourne), October 16, 1992; and The Canberra Times, October 17, 1992.

72. See, The Age (Melbourne), November 6, 1991.

73. See, The Australian (Sydney), May 1, 1992.